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During the past decade, Canada and the United States undertook significant 
reforms that affected the income tax treatment of corporations in each country. 
Arguably,  one of the most  significant changes introduced by  these reforms 
was with respect to the Canadian and U.S. tax treatment of U.S.  multination- 
als operating in Canada.' In this paper,  we examine the impact of U.S. and 
Canadian  tax  reforms  on  the  financing  of  U.S. multinationals  operating 
in  Canada prior  to and  after  Canadian  and  U.S.  tax  reform  in  the  years 
The data developed for this examination are based on a cross-section time- 
series file of twenty-eight companies for the years 1983-89  that was compiled 
by Arthur Andersen & Co. The virtue of this data set is that it is longitudinal, 
since current data are only one-year cross-section snapshots or aggregate time 
series. Also, we have been able to incorporate 1988 and 1989 data that would 
otherwise be unavailable at this time.  However, the data are limited by  the 
number of observations.2 We cannot, therefore, vouch that the data are repre- 
sentative of all U.S. companies, although we have checked the comparability 
of our data with aggregate calculations found for all U.S. multinational com- 
panies operating  in Canada. Aggregate  1980 data are reported in table 2.1. 
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I. For a documentation  of  the U.S.  treatment of  foreign source income under the new  tax 
reform  law,  see  U.S.  Congress, Joint Committee on Taxation (1987) and Auk and Bradford 
(1990). A review of Canadian tax reform measures and their impacts may be found in Canada, 
Department of Finance (1987), Bruce (1989), and Jog and Mintz (1989). 
2.  Total assets in  1984 equaled to $1.2 billion. This is approximately  1 percent of the  1984 
assets of U.S.  companies operating in Canada, as reported by Frisch and Goodspeed (1990) and 
in the Statistics Canada. CALURA no. 61-210. 
47 Table 2.1  US.-Controlled Foreign Corporations in Canada, 1980: By Selected Industry of Incorporation in Canada (US.$  millions) 
Distributions 
Current  Foreign  out  of 
Percent of  Percent of  Earnings  IncomeTaxes  Current 
U.S.  Foreign  Total  Business  or  Profits  (net, paid in  Earnings  Payout 
Corporations  Corporations  Assets  Receipts  before Tax  Canada)  Total  or Profit  Ratio (%) 
Industry  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (8) f  (5) 
All industries  2,527  5,415  $90,044  $100,773  $8,285  $3,143  $1,988  $1,559  18.8% 
Mining  139  240  7,605  4,309  1,212  416  252  202  16.7 
Construction  74  114  1,092  2,387  85  32  27  8  9.4 
Manufacturing  1,179  1,741  43,581  66,335  5,039  2,017  1,274  1,026  20.3 
Transportation and  89  172  5,908  4,556  338  112  113  83  24.5 
Wholesale trade  536  677  3,850  8.525  722  235  166  136  18.8 
Retail trade  92  260  2,942  8,042  289  102  130  87  30.1 
(35.6)  (39.9)  (3.28)  (1.24)  (0.786)  (0.617) 
(54.7)  (31.0)  (8.72)  (2.99)  (1.81)  (1.45) 
(14.8)  (32.3)  (1.15)  (0.43)  (0.36)  (0.11) 
(37.0)  (56.3)  (4.27)  (1.71)  (1.08)  (0.87) 
public utilities  (66.4)  (51.2)  (3.80)  (1.37)  (1.27)  (0.93) 
(7.18)  (15.9)  (1.34)  (0.44)  (0.31)  (0.25) 
(32.0)  (87.4)  (3.14)  (1.11)  (1.41)  (0.95) 
Nore: Numbers in parentheses are, for each category, the average number of U.S. dollars per corporation. 49  Tax  Reform Impacts of U.S. Subsidiaries in Canada 
These numbers roughly compare to the aggregate data of our sample for ear- 
lier years. 
Section 2.1 of  this paper describes the changes to Canadian and U.S. tax 
law during the period 1983-89.  U.S. tax reform provisions began to apply to 
U.S. companies in 1987, while Canadian Phase I tax reform measures applied 
to Canadian companies in 1986, Phase I1 reforms in 1988. 
Section 2.2 outlines various hypotheses that would be drawn from theory 
regarding the impact of  Canadian and U.S. reforms. The hypotheses we are 
concerned with deal with changes in financial behavior: in particular, dividend 
payouts,  cross-border charges (nondividend payments to  the parent),  and 
debt. 
Section 2.3 presents data that are a preliminary confirmation or rejection of 
the hypotheses. The results are interesting, but we have to be cautious with 
respect to interpretation. Some of the trends that we notice may be explained 
by both tax and nontax factors. Only further data development and statistical 
testing would allow us to disentangle the factors that influence financial be- 
havior. 
Subject to this caution, we obtain the following main results: 
A dramatic increase took place both in  the number of  companies issuing 
dividends and in dividend payout ratios from the 1983-85  subperiod to the 
1987-89  subperiod. In the latter, the average ratio of dividends paid to net 
income was close to 100 percent when companies chose to pay  out divi- 
dends. The observed growth in dividend payments for this data set is con- 
sistent with the 50 percent real growth in dividends remitted abroad as re- 
ported on a national income accounts basis.3 Both tax and nontax factors 
can explain this significant increase in dividend payouts. 
Companies that tended to pay dividends also paid more of their income to 
U.S. parents in the form of cross-border charges. As discussed below, this 
is consistent with a tax-minimizing strategy on the part of  the parent and 
its subsidiary. 
Little change occurred in aggregate debt-asset ratios over the two subper- 
iods. However, on a firm-by-firm basis, the debt-asset ratios increased for 
a majority of companies, falling for the remainder. The increase in debt- 
asset ratios was found to be significant. Both tax and nontax factors can 
explain these results. 
2.1  Tax Changes during the Period 1983 to 1989 
Since 1985 in Canada and  1984 in the United States, significant changes 
have occurred in the tax systems of both countries. The focus here is exclu- 
3.  Computed in table 2.2. During the  1975-82  period, dividends remitted abroad were, on 
average, $2.7 billion per year. During the years 1983-85,  dividends remitted abroad were $3.7 
billion per year. In the 1987-89  period, dividends remitted abroad were $6.4 billion per year. 
Corrected for inflation, the growth in dividends was 50 percent from 1983-85 to 1987-89. 50  Roy D. Hogg and Jack M. Mintz 
Table 2.2  Dividends Paid to Nonresidents and Canadian Exchange Rates, 
by Year 
Canadian Exchange Rate 
Dividends  (U.S. Cents, Average 
Year  ($ billion)  Closing Prices) 
1983  $2.5  80.4 cents 
1984  3.9  15.1 
1985  4.6  71.5 
1986  5.8  72.4 
1987  4.7  77.0 
1988  8.5  83.9 
1989  5.9  86.3 
Source: Bank of Canada, 1990, Review. 
sively on the provisions that affect wholly owned Canadian subsidiaries of 
U. S. parent companies. 
2.1.1  Statutory Tax Rates 
Table 2.3 shows the changes in the statutory rates of both countries between 
1985 and 1989. For purposes of illustration and to make the table meaningful, 
both Canadian federal and provincial rates are combined, and both U.S. fed- 
eral and state rates are shown, using the Canadian provinces of Quebec and 
Ontario and the U.S. states of Illinois and New York to illustrate the rate com- 
parisons,  in  addition to reporting weighted average corporate tax rates.  In 
Canada, the lower effective statutory tax rate on manufacturing, both federal 
and provincial, has been segregated. The rates of tax imposed by  provinces 
other than Quebec are very close to the Ontario rates. 
Prior to 1986, as table 2.3,  indicates, statutory rates were generally lower in 
Canada than in the United States. Getting money “home” by way of dividends 
did not lead to additional taxes paid because the 10 percent Canadian rate of 
withholding on dividends  was  creditable against other taxes.4 From a  tax 
viewpoint,  little attention was  paid  to  cross-border charges,  and  therefore 
there was  a limited focus on whether proper charges were made for such 
things as management and administration fees (particularly “specific expense 
reimbursements”) and royalties, and transfer prices for goods. Attention had 
to be paid, however, to the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of  the 
United States (the “code”), and its regulations governing the deductibility of 
costs and expenses that may otherwise relate to the business of a subsidiary or 
related entity and be appropriately chargeable to that other entity.5 
It is arguable that beginning in 1986, outside of Quebec, some tax incentive 
4.  Article X (2)(a) of the Canada-United  States Income Tax Convention 1980 (the “treaty”). 
5.  Section 482 of  the code and the detailed rules found in regulations  1.482-1 and 1.482-2 to 
the code. 51  Tax Reform Impacts of  U.S. Subsidiaries in Canada 
Table 2.3  Comparative Tax Rates* 
Year 
United States  Canada 
Average  M&P$  Average for All 
New  for All  Provinces and 
York  Illinois  Statest  Quebec  Ontario  Quebec  Ontario  Industriest 




holding tax  48.17  56.74  42.63  50.30  53.02 




holding tax  41.41  49.91  39.13  46.73  45.45 
*Rates, provided for comparative purposes only, may not be entirely accurate due to surtaxes or special 
taxesicredits for certain types of income or use of  capital. 
t  Weighted average of  state/provincial corporate tax rates, with the weights based on the distribution of 
corporate taxable income. 
$Manufacturing and processing credit applied. 
exists to increase cross-border charges and transfer pricing so as to take ad- 
vantage of the tax rate arbitrage that now exists in favor of the United States. 
2.1.2 
For the most part, recent corporate tax reform in Canada was proposed in 
1985, and  implementation began  in  February  1986. Significant technical 
amendments have been introduced almost every year since, and presently Bill 
C-18, dated May 30, 1991, consolidates amendments released in draft form 
in July  1990 and again, after extensive consultation, in February 1991. The 
amendments proposed in Bill C-18, yet to be  passed into law (i.e.,  given 
“royal assent”),  relate not only to federal budget initiatives, the traditional 
ways of  introducing tax changes in Canada, but also to various other initia- 
tives introduced by Canada’s minister of finance by way of press releases and 
other pronouncements. 
The major statutory changes in the system in Canada in the period  1983 
through 1989, as they might affect Canadian subsidiaries of U.S. parents, are 
as follows: 
Statutory Changes in the System-Canada 
Rates of tax (see table 2.3) 
Capital cost allowance (tax depreciation) 
Repeal of the inventory allowance 
Corporate surtaxes 
Increase in the effective statutory tax rate on manufacturing profits 52  Roy D. Hogg and Jack M. Mintz 
Investment tax credits 
Scientific research and experimental development tax credit 
Tax avoidance-general  antiavoidance rule (GAAR) 
Rates of  TLUC 
As referred to earlier, table 2.3 indicates what happened to statutory rates 
of  tax in Canada between 1985 and 1989. More important, however, the av- 
erage rates of  corporate income tax (tax divided by book profits) in Canada 
have increased as a result of a number of initiatives. These initiatives are dis- 
cussed below. 
Capital Cost Allowance 
Capital cost allowance has been curtailed by  way of reduced rates on spe- 
cific categories of  assets.  For example, manufacturing and processing ma- 
chinery and equipment, with certain exceptions, falls into a 25 percent declin- 
ing  balance  class  after  tax  reform,  as  opposed  to  the  former  50 percent 
straight-line rule. 
Repeal of  the Inventory Allowance 
In taxation years commencing before February 26,  1986, the Income Tax 
Act (the “act”) provided for a deduction in computing income from business 
or property of an amount equal to 3 percent of tangible property held in inven- 
tory for sale and for the purposes of  being processed, fabricated, manufac- 
tured, incorporated into, attached to, or otherwise converted into or used in 
the packaging of  property for sale in the ordinary course of  business. The 
inventory allowance, an effective rate reduction for taxpayers with inventories 
of tangible property was to compensate for inflation given the use of first-in, 
first-out accounting for tax purposes in Canada. 
Corporate Surtaxes 
Canada has a relatively long history of corporate surtax as a means of tem- 
porarily adjusting the statutory rate of corporate income tax as it applies to 
specific categories of taxpayers. Initially, the corporate surtax applied only to 
taxable production profits from a mineral  resource and  manufacturing  and 
processing profits, to the extent that profits exceeded a percentage (30 percent) 
of the corporation’s Canadian manufacturing and processing profits, at a rate 
of  10 percent of tax otherwise payable. For the year 1983, the rate of surtax 
was basically 2%  percent of  tax otherwise payable.6 For the year 1984, the 
rate of  surtax was 5 percent.’ In  1985 and  1986, Canada had a break from 
surtax, but in 1987, the corporate surtax was reintroduced for taxation years 
6. Section 123.5 of the act, repealed by 1985, c.45, S.69(1). 
7. Section 123.3 of the act, repealed by 1985, c.45, S.69(1). 53  Tax  Reform Impacts of U.S. Subsidiaries in Canada 
ending after 1986 at a rate of  3 percent of tax otherwise payable.* That rate of 
surtax continues to be applicable. 
Various provinces have also used a corporate surtax as a means of tempo- 
rarily adjusting their effective rates of  corporate income tax. Quebec for ex- 
ample, introduced a corporate surtax at a rate of 7.25 percent, beginning May 
1, 1986. 
increase in the Effective Tax Rate on Manufacturing Pro& 
As an incentive to expanding manufacturing and processing in Canada, as 
opposed to the export of raw materials from Canada’s rich natural resource 
base, Canada introduced in 1972 a favorable rate of tax on “Canadian manu- 
facturing and processing profits” determined as part of income according to a 
formula set out in regulations to the act. Initially, the rate of reduction in the 
corporate tax rate otherwise applicable was 9 percent, reducing to 7 percent 
for taxation years ending after June 1987. (Canadian-controlled private cor- 
porations were permitted an even greater reduction.) After June 1988, the rate 
of reduction was reduced to 5 percent of Canadian manufacturing and process- 
ing profits. 
investment Tcuc  Credits 
Complex provisions have provided for investment tax credits in Canada 
since the mid-1970s as a means of encouraging capital investment. The rates 
in Canada vary according to region. The general rate of credit is 7 percent but 
can vary up to 60 percent (before 1989) and 45  percent (after 1988) for an 
“approved project property.” To  the extent of a taxpayer’s “annual investment 
tax  credit  limit”  (basically,  for  Canadian  subsidiaries,  the  aggregate  of 
$24,000 plus three-fourths of the tax otherwise payable in excess of $24,000), 
a taxpayer may deduct the investment tax credit from tax otherwise payable. 
Because of  the variation in rates, regions, projects, and circumstances, any 
comparison of investment tax credits allowable in the years 1983-89  is diffi- 
cult. Suffice it to say that rates of credit were declining in the period. 
ScientiJic Research and Experimental Development Tax Credit 
Canada permits an immediate deduction of  both current expenditures on 
scientific research (as determined to be qualified according to detailed regula- 
tions) made both in and outside Canada and capital expenditures on scientific 
research made in Canada.9 
In the period 1983-89,  the rules with respect to what qualified as “scientific 
research and experimental development” were tightened several times. How- 
ever, outside of the province of  Quebec, the general statement can be made 
8. Section 123.2  of the act. 
9. Sections 37 and 37.1 of  the act. 54  Roy D. Hogg and Jack M. Mintz 
that Canada’s rules do not provide sufficient tax incentive, relative to the U.S. 
rules on research and development, to shift major research projects and the 
costs and tax effects thereof from Canada to the United States. 
Tm  Avoidance-GAAR 
The general antiavoidance rule, commonly referred to as the GAAR, is 
applicable with respect to transactions entered into on or after September 13, 
1988, other than grandfathered transactions.1o  Much has been said and written 
about the GAAR, and no paper on corporate income taxation can be consid- 
ered complete without at least some reference to its existence. Like most good 
antiavoidance provisions in any taxing statute, the GAAR does its job most 
effectively by just being there. 
Specific transactions may be attacked by Canada using the GAAR, but the 
act has always had avoidance provisions’  and provisions which specifically 
address transactions between persons not dealing with each other at arm’s 
length.lz Therefore,  it does not appear likely that the GAAR will have any 
dramatic impact upon parenthbsidiary behavior from a tax viewpoint. 
2.1.3  Nonstatutory Changes-Canada 
Administrative procedures  and  assessing practices  are  becoming  much 
more focused and efficient in terms of  tax collection. In the area of  transfer 
pricing of goods sold between parent and subsidiary or between any related 
nonresident entities and the Canadian subsidiary, Canada is considerably more 
active and diligent than in the past in reviewing the basis for the transfer pric- 
ing. Tax cases which, as a result of review of transfer pricing issues by Reve- 
nue Canada, Taxation, have proceeded to the courts evidence mixed results.  l3 
It is safe to say that taxpayers are much more aware of the need to adequately 
support transfer prices used in intercompany transactions, even though there 
is clearly a tax motivation (at least since 1986) to charge the Canadian subsid- 
iary the highest price justifiable for the goods. To some degree, this tax moti- 
vation is countered by  customs duties, payable on transaction value for the 
goods. 
Our study makes no attempt to focus on the issue of transfer pricing. 
Revenue Canada, Taxation, is also focusing more sharply in recent years on 
other cross-border charges such as interest, rents, royalties, and management 
and administration fees and charges that are supportable as reimbursement for 
specific costs and expenses incurred by  the parent on behalf of  and for the 
benefit of  the Canadian subsidiary. Specific expense reimbursements are de- 
10.  Section 245 of  the act. 
11. Former subsections 245( 1) and 245(2) of the act, amended by 1988, c.55, S. 185( 1). 
12.  For example, see section 69 of the act. 
13.  The Queen v. Irving Oil Ltd., (1991) DTC 5106 (F.C.A.);  Dominion Bridge Co.  Ltd. v. 
The Queen, (1977) DTC 5367 (F.C.A.);  Spur Oil Ltd. v. The Queen, (1981) DTC 5168 (F.C.A.); 
Aluminum Co. of  Canada Ltd. v. The Queen, (1974) DTC 6408 (F.C.T.D.) 55  Tax Reform Impacts of  U.S. Subsidiaries in Canada 
ductible in  Canada and  can be  paid to nonresidents without any Canadian 
withholding tax being applied. (The income received by  the parent is treated 
as U.S.-source income.) There is therefore a tax motivation for charging the 
Canadian subsidiary the maximum for such costs. During the period  1983- 
89, the rules in this regard remained unchanged except for the change in the 
treaty in  1985 which effectively removed the requirement that management 
fees be a reimbursement of  costs and included such fees as part of  business 
profits. 
However, what might be referred to as the “tax tension” between Canada 
and the United States has increased significantly with respect to cross-border 
charges. Although Revenue Canada, Taxation, admittedly struggles at the as- 
sessing level to ascertain exactly what it should be asking for in the way of 
factual support for cross-border charges, it is nevertheless much more active 
in  reviewing and questioning the deductibility of  such costs. From a U.S. 
perspective, on the other hand, there may be a strong need in many cases to 
bring funds back to the United States (to repay high interest rate debt, to fund 
expansion in the United States and elsewhere, to eliminate exchange risks on 
potential devaluation of the Canadian dollar, etc.). In addition, the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) is equally becoming more diligent in applying the pro- 
visions of the codeI4  to costs and expenses which from a U.S. tax standpoint 
are legitimately chargeable to the Canadian subsidiary. 
Interest, rents, and royalties are fully deductible for tax purposes in Canada 
(assuming that reasonableness and capitalization tests are met) and subject 
only to Canadian nonresident withholding tax upon payment or credit (15 per- 
cent in the case of interest and 10 percent in the case of royalties when paid or 
credited to the United States).I5 
The discussion needs to be taken further. During the period studied, some 
U.S. parents that were substantially indebted as a result of leveraged buyout 
and other acquisition financing took steps to move some of the debt out of the 
United States and into Canada and other foreign subsidiaries. Arrangements 
were made with Canadian lenders, sometimes with the guarantee of the U.S. 
parent, to provide financing to the Canadian subsidiary. This allowed the sub- 
sidiary to repatriate more dividends or other funds to the U.S. parent. 
In more recent years, acquisition debt has actually been arranged in Canada 
for the acquisition price related to the Canadian subsidiary. As a result, inter- 
est that might in previous years have been included in the total cross-border 
charges paid or credited by the Canadian subsidiary may now be directly paid 
to Canadian lenders and the statistics on cross-border charges affected accord- 
ingly. To  what degree this has occurred can only be determined by more de- 
tailed analysis. 
14. Section 482 of the code. 
15. Paragraphs 212(l)(bj  and 212(lj(dj, respectively, and Article XI with respect to interest, 
Article V1 with respect to rents, and Article XI1 with respect to royalties, of the treaty. 56  Roy D. Hogg and Jack M. Mintz 
2.1.4  Statutory Changes in the System-United  States 
The United States experienced significant reform of  its corporate income 
tax system in both 1984 and 1986. Those reforms affected not only domestic 
U.S. operations and income but also the determination of foreign-source in- 
come for U.S. purposes and the allowable foreign tax credits for income taxes 
paid outside the United States. 
1984 Reforms 
Prior to the reforms introduced in 1984, earnings and profits of  a foreign 
corporation were generally classified and maintained on an overall basis. A 
U.S. corporation, in the determination of the foreign tax credit limitation, had 
the opportunity of  averaging high- and low-taxed income in one overall for- 
eign tax credit limitation calculation. Only certain interest income and divi- 
dends from domestic international sales corporation (DISC) required the cal- 
culation of separate foreign tax credit limitations. 
In addition, prior to 1984, a U.S. taxpayer corporation could create foreign- 
source income simply by earning income through a foreign corporation. Inter- 
est income, otherwise subject to separate limitation, could be converted into 
income subject to the overall foreign tax credit limitation by earning the inter- 
est income through a foreign corporation. 
The 1984 tax reform act introduced two very important changes with re- 
spect to the determination of U.S. foreign tax credits: 
1. U.S.-source treatment was prescribed for certain income regardless of 
the fact that such income would otherwise be classified as foreign-source in- 
come (only for the purposes of the foreign tax credit limitation). 
2.  “Look-through” rules were introduced, which provided that interest in- 
come generated by certain foreign corporations retained its character as inter- 
est income upon an actual or deemed distribution  or when paid out as interest. 
Foreign corporations could no longer be  used as a vehicle for transforming 
into foreign-source income what would otherwise be U.S .-source income. 
Interest retained its character as interest. Such interest income and asso- 
ciated foreign taxes, commonly referred to as “separate limitation interest,” 
were subject to their own separate foreign tax credit limitation. 
Separate “baskets,” or pools, of foreign earnings, for purposes of determin- 
ing the foreign tax credit limitation, were created for foreign sales corporation 
(FSC) dividends and for taxable income of an  FSC attributable  to foreign trade 
income. 
1986 Reforms 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (1986 TRA) maintained the basic principle of 
the  overall (as opposed to  separate-country) foreign tax  credit  limitation. 
However, the 1986 TRA added a number of separate baskets for determining 
the total foreign tax credit limitation. This expanded system of baskets was 
designed to prevent averaging of low-tax foreign-source  income with high-tax 57  Tax Reform Impacts of U.S. Subsidiaries in Canada 
foreign-source income. The foreign tax credit rules, as amended by  the 1986 
TRA, provide that deemed-paid foreign tax credits should be applied sepa- 
rately with respect to each foreign tax credit limitation basket. Five foreign 
tax credit limitation baskets were increased to at least nine by adding separate 
baskets for financial services income, shipping income, high withholding tax 
interest, and dividends from each noncontrolled code section 902 foreign cor- 
poration. 
Look-through rules were expanded to ensure that the character of the eam- 
ings and profits and foreign taxes paid were preserved for purposes of deter- 
mining the foreign tax credit. 
In addition, foreign income taxes paid or accrued with respect to a separate 
category of income now  include, under the amendments of  the 1986 TRA, 
only those taxes that are “related’ to income falling into a separate basket. For 
example, if  foreign law exempted a particular type, or category, of  income 
from tax, then no foreign income taxes would be allocable to that income. 
The foreign tax credit limitation regulations, as amended in the 1986 TRA, 
prescribe detailed rules for the  allocation of  expenses, including interest, 
against income in each separate basket. Interest paid to related persons is first 
netted against foreign personal holding company income; the excess, along 
with other expenses, is allocated to the income included in  each separate 
basket. 
Under the law, as it existed prior to the 1986 TRA, taxpayers could mini- 
mize the expenses allocated against foreign-source income by  applying the 
expense  allocation  regulations  on  a  separate-company  basis.  Using  this 
method, if the debt was incurred by a Canadian subsidiary that had only U.S. 
income or assets, the interest expense would be  entirely allocable to U.S.- 
source income,Txidiexs wf .tlk kxxz~~  e: aasts .d  ,&e.r  ,wmk.rs  nf  fithe 
group. The regulations, as they then existed, also allowed taxpayers to allo- 
cate interest expense on the basis of U.S. or foreign gross income relative to 
total gross income as an alternative to allocating expenses on the basis of U.S. 
or foreign assets relative to total assets. 
It was a common practice for U.S. companies to hold all foreign subsidi- 
aries in a U.S. holding company with no debt, so that all U.S. interest expense 
was allocated against U.S. income. 
The 1986 TRA amended the law so that interest expense of  an affiliated 
group of corporations must be apportioned between U.S. and foreign sources 
by  taking into account all assets of the U.S.-affiliated group as if  it were one 
corporation. The gross income method for computing the amount of interest 
expense that can be allocated to foreign and U.S. sources is no longer avail- 
able. 
This new rule for allocating interest applies to interest expenses incurred in 
tax years beginning after 1986, but only with regard to the interest associated 
with the increase in the aggregate amount of indebtedness outstanding on No- 
vember 16, 1985. Specific phase-in rules apply to interest expense associated 
with the debt outstanding on or before November 16, 1985. 58  Roy D. Hogg and Jack M. Mintz 
General and administrative expenses, which under prior law were allocable 
on a separate-company basis, under the 1986 TRA are also allocable by treat- 
ing an affiliated group as one taxpayer. 
Rents and royalties, however, are treated as income in a separate category 
to the extent that such rents or royalties are allocable to the income of  a for- 
eign corporation in the separate category. 
Rules first published in 1977 with respect to the allocation of research and 
development expenditures but  subject to a moratorium introduced in  1982 
were reenacted by the 1986 TRA. Under these rules, most research and devel- 
opment expenses are allocated to U.S. foreign sources either on the basis of 
U.S.  or foreign sales over  total  sales or under the optional gross income 
method. The new rules were applicable for the taxable year beginning after 
August 1, 1986, and on or before August 1, 1987. 
The combination of the expansion of the number of pools, or baskets, and 
the allocation of expenses, including interest, to each separate pool of income 
generally resulted in U.S. corporate taxpayers with excess foreign tax credits 
in the active-income basket and excess limitations in the other separate bas- 
kets. Requiring earnings and profits and related foreign taxes to be maintained 
in separate pools based on income categories prevents taxpayers from taking 
advantage of varying effective rates of foreign tax on different types of income 
in order to maximize the foreign tax credit. 
The 1986 TRA changed what was an elective method of computing earn- 
ings and profits (referred to as the “partial section 946 method’) to a required 
method (functional currency method). The “functional” currency is the cur- 
rency used  for calculating subsidiary earnings and profits. After  1986, the 
functional currency method required assets and liabilities as well as profits to 
be maintained in foreign currency, except for currencies of hyperinflationary 
countries  and  contiguous  countries.  One  new  requirement,  however,  was 
added. Foreign taxes, under the  1986 TRA, are maintained in U.S. dollars 
rather than in local currency. 
Maintaining earnings and profits in a functional currency and foreign in- 
come tax in U.S. dollars can have a significant impact on the effective foreign 
tax rate. When the Canadian dollar has appreciated vis-l-vis the U.S. dollar 
from the date the earnings were generated to the time the earnings were dis- 
tributed or deemed distributed, then the effective tax rate on the earnings of 
the Canadian corporation decreases.  l6 Table 2.2 shows the Canadian dollar 
exchange rates for the years 1983-89. 
Prior to the 1986 TRA and effective for years prior to 1987, earnings and 
profits for purposes of the foreign tax credit limitation rules were determined 
on a year-by-year basis. Foreign taxes paid were also allocated year by  year. 
It was possible for some taxpayers to structure effective foreign tax rates by 
16. For example, assume that income earned in 1989, at a time when the Canadian dollar was 
at 80 cents (relative to the U.S. dollar), is repatriated by  way of dividend to the U.S. percentage 
in 1991, when the Canadian dollar has appreciated to 90 cents. Assume further a Canadian federal 
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not claiming discretionary deductions in one year and maximizing discretion- 
ary deductions in another taxation year (sometimes referred to as the “rhythm 
method”). The discretionary deductions often used in Canada for such pur- 
poses  were  capital cost  allowances (discretionary as opposed to  the U.S. 
“claimed or claimable” rule) and specific reserves and allowances (e.g., al- 
lowance for doubtful accounts). Such discretionary deductions, determined 
according to U.S. rules, would reduce earnings and profits for U.S. purposes. 
Rather than paying  dividends,  say, of  equal amounts, in two successive 
taxation years, a dividend of the same aggregate amount might be paid in the 
year of higher Canadian taxes. When measured as a ratio of that year’s eam- 
ings and profits,  the aggregate dividend (the numerator in the foreign tax 
credit limitation formula) would represent a higher proportion of  that year’s 
foreign taxes paid and creditable according to the limitation formula. Because 
the deductions were discretionary, the only additional Canadian tax cost in- 
volved in the process would be the imputed interest cost of  the timing differ- 
ence of  the deductions. 
By replacing the year-by-year calculation of U.S. earnings and profits with 
an accumulation-of-years, or pooling, basis, the  1986 TRA eliminated any 
advantage of the use of the rhythm method in claiming foreign tax credits. 
The 1986 TRA made other changes that had an indirect, if not direct, effect 
on foreign tax credit imitations. Effective July 1, 1987, the top rate of corpo- 
rate income tax was reduced from 46 percent to 34 percent (for a calendar- 
year taxpayer, the rate for 1987 would be 40 percent). Although the rate of tax 
was reduced, a number of  measures were adopted to broaden the base upon 
which tax was imposed. Some of the more significant amendments adopted 
were: 
1. The replacement of the existing “add-on minimum tax” with a new cor- 
porate “alternative minimum tax,” in an attempt to ensure that all corporations 
with financial statement income pay some tax currently on that income. 
2. The revamping of  the accelerated cost recovery system (ACRS) intro- 
duced in  198  1. The new ACRS rules were designed to more evenly match 
Income of  Canadian Income 
Canadian  Dividend Paid to  Taxes Paid 
Subsidiary  U.S. Parent  (40%)*  Effective Tax 
Year  Canadian  U.S.  Canadian  U.S.  Canadian  U.S.  to Dividend 
Rate Applicable 
1989  $1.00  $0.80  $0.40  $0.32 
1991  $1.00  $0.90  $0.3260.90 = 35.6% 
*Not including Canadian withholding taxes on dividend to U.S. parent. 
The Canadian income taxes paid, in U.S. dollars equal to 40 percent of $.80, or $.32, are mea- 
sured relative to a dividend of U.S. $.90 in 1991, and the effective rate of Canadian income taxes, 
exclusive of applicable Canadian withholding taxes on the dividend, decreases from 40 percent to 
U.S. $.90 f  U.S. $.32,or35.6percent. 60  Roy D. Hogg and Jack M. Mintz 
class lives with economic or useful lives of particular assets and were effective 
mainly for property placed in service after July 3  1, 1986. The new system of 
ACRS, generally speaking, is less generous than the combination of the old 
ACRS and the investment tax credits. 
3.  The introduction of  new  limitations on the use of  net operating loss 
carryovers, effective where there is more than a 50 percent ownership change, 
by value, of a loss corporation. 
4.  The introduction of new rules with respect to the measurement and tim- 
ing of taxable income (for example, new uniform cost capitalization  rules). 
2.1.5  Nonstatutory Changes-United  States 
In  a mature tax environment such as the United States, it should not be 
surprising that tax collectors become more sophisticated, knowledgeable, and 
hence more aggressive. As expected, the IRS has focused considerable atten- 
tion on costs and expenses allocable to the earning of income from Canadian 
subsidiaries and repatriated to the U.S. parent by  way  of  dividends. Rules 
which have existed for a long time (e.g., the provisions of section 482 of the 
code) are now more consistently and more stringently applied. Audit teams 
are trained in the area of  international operations, and  sophisticated tech- 
niques such as functional analysis as being applied to the issue of  transfer 
pricing. The capacity of the IRS is enhanced by the same technology available 
to private business, and the exchange-of-information provisions of  various 
treaties form the basis for a joint audits of international operations and much 
more detailed knowledge of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. parents. 
2.2  Predictions regarding Tax Reform Impacts 
This section outlines the predicted responses in behavior of U.S. multina- 
tionals following the tax changes discussed in section 2.1.”  The U.S.  and 
Canadian reforms are expected to affect three financial variables: debt, cross- 
border charges, and dividends. We do not try to investigate the impact of tax 
reform on investment decisions. 
Hypothesis 1: Tax Reform Measures Adopted in 1986-87  Favor Local Debt 
Finance of US.  Subsidiaries in Canada 
As cited in section 2.1, two tax factors would particularly encourage more 
debt being issued in Canada by  U.S.  subsidiaries. First, the higher statutory 
tax rate in Canada relative to the United States encourages debt finance in 
Canada,  where  nominal  interest deductions have  greater tax  value  to  the 
17.  The discussion in this section refers to earlier theoretical work, particular that developed 
by  Bruce (1989) and Leechor and Mintz (1990).  See also Horst (1977), Jun (1990), Slemrod 
(1990), Grubert and Mutti (1989), and Hines and Hubbard (1990), who have tested the effects of 
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firm.I8  Although particularly true for U.S. companies in an excess credit po- 
sition, it also applies to companies in a deficient credit position.Ig  Second, the 
new U.S. rules for the allocation of interest costs encourage debt to be issued 
by the Canadian subsidiary (and discourage debt to be issued by the parent to 
finance investments in Canada). As noted above, the  1986 U.S. reform re- 
quires parents to allocate U.S. borrowing costs to the subsidiary based on the 
allocation of assets of a corporate group. 
Although these tax factors suggest that the Canadian and U.S. reforms en- 
courage more debt finance taken in Canada rather than in the United States, 
there is at least one tax factor that would point to a reduction in the use of  debt 
finance by both the subsidiary and the parent. Reform-induced lower statutory 
corporate tax rates in both countries encourage the parent and subsidiary to 
reduce leverage.2o  On the other hand, the broadening of tax bases in both the 
United  States  and  Canada reduces the  incidence of  potential  tax  losses, 
thereby encouraging more leverage as interest deductions become more valu- 
able to companies that were previously not paying taxes despite the reduction 
in statutory corporate tax rates. 
Other economic factors also have affected leverage over this period. The 
1981-82  recession in Canada led to a significant increase in debt ratios due to 
shortages of cash  As a result, leverage ratios were high in 1983, falling 
over time as economic recovery took place. Also, the recession may  have 
increased bankruptcy risk (captured by  the past variance in rates of  return on 
capital), thereby discouraging leverage by Canadian firms after 1982. 
Hypothesis 2:  Cross-Border Charges Would Increase as a Result of  US.  and 
Canadian Tax Reform in 1986-87.  They Would Also Be Positively 
Correlated with Remitted Dividends Paid to the US.  Parent as Parents 
Average Excess and Deficient Credits on Remitted Income to Reduce 
Canadian and US.  Taxes Paid. 
As remarked above, after U.S. and Canadian reforms, Canadian corporate 
tax  rates  were generally higher than U.S.  rates. To  take advantage of  the 
18.  See Halpern and Mintz (1991) for specific calculations on the impact of the higher corpo- 
rate tax rate in Canada on the cost of debt finance of U.S. multinationals. These calculations do 
not take into account Canadian “thin capitalization” rules that limit interest deductions of non- 
arm’s-length debt held by foreign parents in their subsidiaries. 
19.  See Leechor and Mintz (1990) for a derivation of the cost of issuing debt when a company 
is in a deficient tax credit position. Additional debt taken in Canada could increase or reduce the 
rate of U.S. tax on remitted dividends, depending on the differences between the tax bases as well 
as between statutory rates of  tax of  the two countries. 
20.  See Bartholdy, Fisher, and Mintz (1989) and MacKie-Mason (1990) for evidence that a 
reduction in tax benefits of interest deductions from corporate taxable income reduces the incen- 
tive to issue debt. Of course, as remarked in section 2.1, the significant rise in leveraged buyout 
(LBO) debt in the United States had increased leverage there for many parents, including some in 
our sample. We  are not able to investigate this matter because we do not have matching data for 
the parent companies. 
21.  Bartholdy, Fisher,  and Mintz  (1989), MacKie-Mason  (1990), and readings in Hubbard 
(1990) confirm the importance of cash flow in reducing leverage. 62  Roy D. Hogg and Jack M. Mintz 
higher Canadian corporate tax rate, there would have been an incentive to take 
deductions for interest,  management fees,  royalties,  and  specific expense 
reimbursements, especially those items that are not subject to withholding tax 
or are taxed at low withholding rates in Canada. 
In addition, the U.S. reform did not broaden the tax base for the calculation 
of earnings and profits, but it did lower the corporate tax rate on earnings and 
profits. Thus, many parents found that they moved from a deficient to excess 
credit position. When companies are remitting income to the United States, 
excess credits are not desirable from a tax-minimizing point of view since they 
are not being applied to taxes on other forms of income earned by the parent. 
The tax cost of remitting dividend and other sources of income is the Canadian 
withholding tax,  which cannot be credited when the parent is in an excess 
credit position. This tax could be more than U.S. tax (net of  deemed-paid 
foreign tax  credits) paid  on remitted income when the parent is in a small 
deficient tax credit position. 
To minimize excess tax credits on remitted income in  Canada, the parent 
could try, by taking more deductions in Canada, to reduce taxes paid in Can- 
ada. If they qualify under U.S. basket rules, the remitted cross-border charges 
would also generate a deficient credit position on income taxed at the U. S . 
rate, soaking up any excess credits, particularly on dividends. This form of 
averaging reduces  taxes paid  in  Canada without increasing the amount of 
taxes paid to the U.S. government on remitted income. 
During this period, nonstatutory tax factors also affected the use of  cross- 
border charges by multinationals. As remarked in section 2.1, administrative 
practices by  tax  authorities in  Canada and the United States changed with 
respect to the auditing of U.S. parent and subsidiary accounts. Cross-border 
charges were particularly subject to diligent review by  authorities, and com- 
panies were less apt to use them. 
Hypothesis 3: Tax Reform in the Period 1986-87 Reduces the Incentive 
to Reinvest Earnings in Canada. Dividend Payouts Would Increase after 
Tax Reform. 
The impact of tax reform on U.S. subsidiary dividend payouts is quite dif- 
ficult to determine theoretically. In theory, the tax cost of remitting dividends 
is the Canadian withholding tax rate when the parent is in an excess credit 
position and the U.S. tax rate (net of foreign corporate and withholding cred- 
its) when the parent is in a deficient tax credit position. It is commonly ac- 
cepted that the incentive for a subsidiary is to defer payment of taxes by rein- 
vesting profits to avoid payment of taxes on remitted income.**  However, the 
tax cost of paying dividends is zero when the deficient tax credit position is 
22. This is due to Hartman  (1985),  who models the  “new,” or “trapped equity,” view  that 
dividends are simply surplus over investment needs. The result applies for the excess tax credit 
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equal to withholding taxes payable on dividends.23  In this case, the parent is 
indifferent to paying out dividends or to reinvesting earnings from a tax point 
of view. Thus, the tax deterrent to paying out dividends is minimized as long 
as the parent can average excess credits on some sources of income with defi- 
cient tax credits on other sources. 
Prior to tax reform in Canada, many companies faced relatively low aver- 
age corporate tax rates. Thus, the U.S. tax on remitted income could be quite 
high,  significantly deterring  repatriation  of  dividends to  the  U.S. parent. 
However, there were two important methods that could be used to minimize 
taxes paid on remitted earnings. First, parent companies could remit income 
from other  sources (e.g., dividends from high-tax countries,  cross-border 
charges) and virtually eliminate any U.S. tax on remitted earnings.24  Second, 
when dividends were remitted,  Canadian subsidiaries could delay claiming 
capital cost allowances, resource write-offs, and investment tax credits and 
push up their average tax rates, thereby eliminating any U.S. tax on remitted 
dividends (the so-called rhythm method).25 
Canadian and U.S. tax reforms changed the tax positions of the subsidiary 
and parent in several ways. The increased Canadian corporate tax payments 
expected to result from Canadian tax reform (and reduced U.S. average tax 
rate on earnings and profits in Canada) reduced, if not eliminated, the differ- 
ence between Canadian and U.S. average tax rates. This subsequently reduced 
the tax incentive to reinvest earnings in Canada. 
On  the other hand,  as discussed in section 2.1, U.S. tax reform also re- 
stricted the ability of U.S. parent companies to minimize U.S. taxes on divi- 
dend repatriations by  “basket clause” provisions and by  the requirement to 
pool earnings over time. To  the extent these provisions are effective, the in- 
centive to reinvest earnings is increased. Although these limitations are im- 
portant, the scope for averaging excess and deficient tax credits to eliminate 
U.S. taxes on foreign-source earnings has not been fully curtailed. However, 
remitted to the parent.  Hartman, however, modeled the multinational investment decision for a 
deficient tax credit position assuming that the U.S. tax rate minus the Canadian tax rate is exoge- 
nous.  As Leechor and Mintz (1990) point out, this result only holds when tax bases are similar 
across countries. If the tax base in the host country is larger than in the home country, it may be 
optimal to finance investment with local debt and pay out dividends to the parent. 
23.  See Hines and Hubbard (1990) for a test of the effect of  taxes on the dividend payout of 
U.S. subsidiary companies. They assume the tax price of remitted income to be zero when the 
parent is in an excess credit position. This is not correct because the true tax cost is the withhold- 
ing tax imposed by the host country In a similar way, the tax price for the deficient tax credit case 
is the U.S. tax, net of foreign tax credits, plus withholding tax paid on remitted dividends. If the 
amount of tax is negative (and credited against offset U.S. tax), the tax price of  dividends may be 
less in the deficient tax credit position than in the excess credit position. 
24.  See Hines and Hubbard (1990) for evidence of this for 1984. 
25.  Indeed, in the year that the dividends are not remitted, the subsidiary could create a tax 
loss by  claiming stored-up deductions and credits and carry back the loss without affecting its 
previous foreign tax credit for U.S. tax purposes. 64  Roy D, Hogg and  Jack M. Mintz 
the incentive to use the rhythm method described above has been virtually 
eliminated. 
The above discussion suggests that tax reform only reduced the incentive to 
reinvest earnings, not eliminated it entirely. So why should dividend payouts 
increase? Two  related answers are provided for this. First, companies may 
have had nontax reasons to remit dividends (Hines and Hubbard 1990). As 
discussed above,  many  U.S.  parents faced cash flow  shortages due to in- 
creased leverage (e.g.,  LBOs).  Cash flow  from foreign subsidiaries would 
alleviate the need to raise funds in the United States.  Second, the interest 
allocation rules, discouraging leverage in the United States, induced U.S. par- 
ents to remit income from Canada to buy down U.S. debt. 
Other nontax factors might explain changes in dividend payouts. Exchange 
rate risk, the increase in the value of the Canadian dollar (beginning in 1987), 
and perceived lower profitability in Canada would induce an outflow of  divi- 
dends from Canada to the United States commensurate with a reduction in 
subsidiary investment in Canada. 
In the following section, we provide some evidence on the impact of tax 
reform with respect to the above three hypotheses. 
2.3  Data and Empirical Results 
2.3.1  Description of Data 
As remarked above, selected data were compiled for twenty-eight compa- 
nies on a confidential basis. In some years, data were missing for ten of the 
twenty-eight companies. 
Of the companies chosen, most were in manufacturing and resource indus- 
tries. The companies also varied considerably by size. In 1989, two were in 
the range of  $5 million to $10 million total assets, ten were in the range of 
$10 million to $25 million of  assets, eight were between $25 million and $100 
million, and eight had assets of more than $100 million. 
Except for five companies, the U.S.  parents of  the Canadian subsidiaries 
were in an excess credit position for all years. We  have not yet been able to 
determine the status of  the other five over the whole period, although they 
were in a deficient tax credit position for the latter part of the period. In the 
past few years, three of the deficient tax credit companies were of the largest 
size. Three of  the five companies issued dividends, and all five had cross- 
border charges in the past three years. Given the lack of data at this point 
regarding the deficient tax credit position, we are unable to do further analysis 
of this case. 
With the data, we calculated several variables that are of particular interest 
in this paper: 
1.  DIV: Dividends remitted to the parent 
2.  CBC: Cross-border charges (royalties, management fees, interest, and 
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3.  Z: After-tax book income prior to the deduction of cross-border charges 
4.  NI: Net income-after-tax  book income net of cross-border charges 
5.  ATR: The average tax rate computed as federal and provincial corporate 
income taxes paid dividend by before-tax income 
6. RE: The return to equity computed as after-tax book income divided by 
equity reserves plus minority interest 
7.  D/A: The debt-asset ratio computed as debt liabilities divided by total 
assetsz6 
8. DIV/NI: The dividend payout ratio computed as dividends divided by 
net income 
9.  CBC/Z and DIV/Z: The cross-border charges and dividend ratios ex- 
pressed as a proportion of net income prior to the deduction of cross-border 
charges 
The data set also had other information related to tax information (e.g., 
investment tax and foreign tax credits), which is not reported below for the 
purposes of this paper. 
2.3.2  Presentation of Aggregate Data for Companies 
In tables 2.4 through 2.6, we provide some descriptive data indicating the 
financial behavior of the companies on an aggregate basis. For this purpose, 
we have dropped data in those years in which companies incurred a loss for 
book purposes (4 of  155 observations). Otherwise, some of the variables, par- 
ticularly the dividend payout and cross-border charge ratios, would be nega- 
tive in value. In terms of the aggregate value of ratios (DIV/NI, DIV/Z, and 
CBC/Z), the  ratios are somewhat understated by  eliminating the years in 
which companies had book losses. 
Table 2.4 presents year-by-year and subperiod ratios for financial variables, 
aggregated across companies. We  note that the dividend payout ratio from 
1983 to 1989 more than doubled over the years, while the CBC and leverage 
ratios hardly changed. Somewhat surprising to us, Canadian average tax rates 
declined rather than increased after tax reform, and the rate of return to equity 
rose significantly. Results in this table seem to reject most of the hypotheses 
offered in the previous section. Only the dividend payout ratio increased. Cer- 
tainly, the higher dividend payout ratio is not indicative of  poor economic 
opportunities in Canada, given the high returns to  Instead, it seems 
the U.S. parents needed to get money home, perhaps arising from the need to 
buy down debt issued by the parent. 
Table 2.5 separates companies according to whether they paid dividends or 
26.  We also measured leverage as debt divided by  fixed assets. There are  few differences in 
these results, compared to that obtained below. Leverage ratios and rates of return to equity are 
not corrected for inflation. 
27.  We  found that the unweighted mean growth rate in fixed assets during the 1987-89  period 
was close to 15 percent, 3.6  percent above the  1983-85 mean. The average growth in fixed assets 
of companies that paid dividends sometime in the years 1987-89  increased 3.9 percent over the 
1983-85  time period. Only three  companies reduced investments in Canada and remitted divi- 
dends. Table 2.4  Average Financial Ratios for All US.-Owned Companies Operating in Canada-1983-89  with 
Positive Net Income 
Dividend  Cross-Border  Mean Asset 
Year  Companies  (DIV/NI)  (CBC)* Ratio  Leverage*  Rate (ATR)  Equity (RE)  ($ million) 
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.20  $12.9 
.21  99.6 
.24  88.2 
Source: Authors’ computations. 
Nore: See Sec. 2.3.1 of  text for explanation of variables 
*Leverage = Debt-asset ratio, or DIA. Table 2.5  Average Financial Ratios for Companies Paying Dividends or Not* 
1983-85  1987-89  1983-89 
DIV  = 0  DIV  = 0  DIV  = 0 
Financial Ratio  DIV > 0  DIV  = 0  CBC = 0  DIV > 0  DIV  = 0  CBC = 0  DIV >  0  DIV = 0  CBC = 0 
Dividend payout (DIV/NI)  .75 
CBC/Z  .I0 
DIV/Z  .67 
Leverage (D/A)  .44 
ATR  .36 
RE?  .22 
Percent of 
total number?  16.7 
Percent of 
total assetsi  34.7 
Mean asset size 











































































Source: Authors’ computations. 
Note: See Sec. 2.3.1 of  text for explanation of  variables. 
*In years with positive net income. 
?Percentage = Number or assets of  firms issuing dividends, or net dividend + Number or total assets of all firms in that period. 68  Roy D. Hogg and Jack M. Mintz 
not. There are three interesting results to glean from this table. First, there 
was a substantial increase in the percentage of companies (both in number and 
weighted by assets) that issued dividends after 1986 compared to the earlier 
period. In fact, most companies did not remit dividends prior to 1986, while 
the majority began paying dividends afterward. We  also note that dividend- 
paying firms tended to be more leveraged and larger in size, and their rate of 
return to equity  was  higher on  average compared to  non-dividend-paying 
companies. 
Second,  we  note  that dividend-paying firms, on average, relied  less on 
cross-border charges than did non-dividend-paying firms in each period. This 
suggests that cross-border charges and dividend remissions were substitutes 
rather than complements, contradicting hypothesis 2. 
Third, the average tax rate prior to 1986 was higher when companies paid 
dividends than when companies were non-dividend paying (36 percent versus 
29 percent). This trend seems to confirm the use of the rhythm method. After 
tax reform, the situation reversed, and dividend-paying companies had lower 
average tax rates than non-dividend-paying companies. 
In table 2.6, we compare ratios for companies that paid corporate income 
taxes to federal and provincial governments and those that did not. Most com- 
panies were taxpaying,  although more tax-loss companies appeared in  the 
prereform years compared to the period afterwards. We  found that companies 
that did not pay income taxes did not remit dividends (although they remitted 
income  through  cross-border  charges).  The  preference  for  cross-border 
charges  arises  from  the  lower  withholding taxes  on  certain  cross-border 
charges, particularly specific expense reimbursements. 
These aggregate calculations (and the lack of statistical testing) do not pro- 
vide the information needed to assess the impact of  tax reform on financial 
variables. Given the small number of  companies (twenty-eight), aggregate 
numbers are sensitive to just a few cases of  firms switching categories (e.g., 
from non-dividend  paying to dividend paying). For example, the fall in the 
average tax rate from the period  1983-85  to the period 1987-89  reflects just 
two large firms significantly lowering their taxes paid. Firm-by-firm statistical 
analysis is thus warranted. 
2.3.2  Empirical Results 
Below, we present some empirical results that test the three hypotheses pre- 
sented in section 2.2. Table 2.7 provides correlation coefficients and tests of 
significance for  various financial variables,  using  the  individual company 
data. Several important results arise from this analysis. 
First, when companies pay dividends, the correlation coefficient between 
DIV/Z and CBC/Z is positive (.53) and significant.2s Unlike the aggregate 
28.  The correlation coefficients for DIVE  and CBC/Z were .85 and .52 for the two subperiods 
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Table 2.6  Average Financial Ratios for U.S. Companies Operating in Canada, by 
Taxpaying Status in Canada* 
1983-85  1987-89  1983-89 
Financial Ratio  Tax > 0  Tax  = 0  Tax > 0  Tax = 0  Tax > 0  Tax  = 0 


































































Source: Authors’ computations. 
Note: See Sec. 2.3. I of  text for explanation of variables. 
*In years with positive net income. 
?Percentage = Number or assets of firms issuing dividends, or net dividend i  Number or total assets 
of all firms in that period. 
time-series information presented in tables 2.4 and 2.5, this seems to indicate 
that companies that remit income to the United States view  dividends and 
cross-border charges as complements rather than as substitutes. This evidence 
confirms hypothesis 2, that companies, when remitting income to the United 
States, average excess tax credits on dividends with deficient tax credits on 
cross-border charges to minimize U.S. tax payments. 
Second, we find that the average tax rate is positively and significantly cor- 
related with both dividend and cross-border charge ratios (for dividend-paying 
companies only). In addition to calculations shown in table 2.7, the correla- 
tion coefficients for ATR and DIV/Z and ATR and CBC/Z were also calculated 
for each subperiod. For ATR  and DIV/Z,  the correlation coefficients, also 
significant, were .56 and .53 for the 1983-85  and 1987-89  periods, respec- 
tively. For ATR  and CBC/Z, the correlation coefficients were .57 and .24 for 
each period, respectively (both significant). In the earlier period, the positive 
correlations between DIV/Z and CBC/Z with ATR  is consistent with a tax- 
minimizing strategy of  using the rhythm method prior to tax reform. When 
companies remitted income, they increased both their Canadian taxes paid on 
dividends and the amount of cross-border charges to reduce U.S. taxes paid. 
After 1986, minimizing U.S. taxes or reducing Canadian excess credits on 
foreign-source income required companies to increase cross-border charges 
with remitted dividends, particularly if the companies were high-taxed firms. 
These correlation coefficient results of table 2.7 contradict conclusions sug- 70  Roy D. Hogg and Jack M. Mintz 
Table 2.7  Correlation Coefficients of Selected Financial Ratios, 1983-1989t 

















Companies with DIV > 0 
Companies with DIV = 0 
1  .o 
-  .01 
-  .08 
.10 
.46* 
1  .o 
-.I0 








1  .o 
.I9 
.31* 
-  .05 
.53* 
.49* 
-  .19* 





0.17  1  .o 
-.I6  -  .08  1  .o 
1  .o 
.47*  1  .o 
-  .29*  -  .21*  I .o 
1  .o 
.09  1  .o 
-  .09  -  .05  1 .o 
Source; Authors'  computations. 
Note; See Sec. 2.3.1 of  text for explanation of variables. 
*Significance  of the 95 percent confidence level. 
?For companies in years with positive net income. 
gested by the aggregate calculations of  table 2.5. Instead of average tax rates 
falling for dividend-paying firms after  1986, we  find a positive correlation 
between the dividend ratio and average tax rate. Also, we find a positive cor- 
relation between cross-border charges and dividends, not the negative one 
suggested by the numbers of table 2.5. 
The aggregate calculations of tables 2.4-2.6  also mask variation in the fi- 
nancial behavior of  individual companies. Over the two subperiods , some 
companies increased certain types of financings, while others did not. To what 
extent has there been a significant change in  financial behavior in the two 
subperiods 1983-85  and  1987-89?  To  answer this question, we calculated, 
for each company, the mean ratios of D/A, DIV/NI, CBC/Z, ATR, and RE for 
the  two  subperiods and  subtracted the  1983-85  mean  from  the  1987-89 
mean. A frequency distribution for each case was plotted (see the histographs 
in figs. 2. 1-2.3)29  and a t-test was performed to determine whether there was 
a significant increase or decrease in the level of each ~ariable.~"  (The test was 
conducted on unweighted mean increases across all companies  .) 
29.  The histographs are presented with a restriction that the change in the ratio lies between 
-  1 .O and  1  .O.  (This eliminates certain  outlying data points that would otherwise show a fre- 
quency distribution with most values falling in a small range.) 
30.  The t-test is based on all values that are computed except for the case of the dividend payout 
ratio that had two outlying values above or below 15.0  and -  15.0, respectively. 71  Tax Reform Impacts of U.S. Subsidiaries in Canada 
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Fig. 2.1  Changes in debt-asset ratios (L) pre- and postreform 
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Fig. 2.2  Changes in dividend payout ratios (D) pre- and postreform 
The frequency distributions are presented below  for the changes in  the 
levels (pre- and post-1986) of debt-asset ratio (D/A), dividend payout ratio 
(DIV/NI), cross-border charge ratio (CBC/Z), average tax rate (ATR), and 
return to equity (RE). Tests on the mean change in the level of  ratios were 
based on a 95 percent confidence test (one-tail test for value greater or less 
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Fig. 2.3  Changes in cross-border charge ratios (C) pre- and postreform 
, 
Hypothesis 1.  The debt-asset ratio increased by  .06 and for a majority of com- 
panies (about 70 percent).  A one-tail t-test indicates that the mean average 
debt-asset ratio increased significantly (t-value of  2.27). This is consistent 
with  hypothesis 1 that the debt-asset ratio of  U.S. multinationals increased 
after 1986, given the higher statutory corporate tax rate in Canada relative to 
the United States and the effects of the new U.S. interest allocation rules. 
Hypothesis 2.  The cross-border ratio fell slightly, by less than .  1 percent. Only 
25 percent of the companies reduced their cross-border charge ratio. The de- 
crease was found to be insignificant (t-ratio of -  .05). This result is not con- 
sistent  with  hypothesis  2, which  predicted  an  increase  in  cross-border 
charges. However, as discussed in section 2.1, there has been a change in the 
auditing practices of Canadian authorities that might have discouraged the use 
of cross-border charges to remit income. 
Hypothesis 3. The dividend payout ratio was found to increase by  .72 and for 
a majority of companies (55 percent increased the dividend payout ratio, 25 
percent remained non-dividend paying throughout the period, and the remain- 
der reduced their dividend payout ratio). A test that the dividend payout ratio 
increased was found to be significant (t-value of 5.1). This is consistent with 
the aggregate calculations shown in tables 2.4-2.6 and with hypothesis 3 that 
dividends remitted to U.S.  parents would possibly increase, perhaps to pay 
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In addition, we calculated the mean increase in average tax rate and return to 
equity ratios. The average tax rate increased by .09 on average and was found 
to be significant (t-value of 2.0). The average profit rate increased .07 and was 
found to be significant (t-value of 2.0). 
2.4  Conclusions 
In summary, we find that the hypotheses seem to be confirmed by the data; 
in particular,  the dividend payout ratio and, to a lesser extent, the debt-asset 
ratio of U.S. subsidiaries have increased. We also find a positive correlation 
between dividend and cross-border charges ratios, indicating that U.  S. multi- 
nationals  average excess and deficient  tax  credits on sources  of  income to 
minimize taxes paid to Canadian and U.S. authorities. We have not, however, 
found a significant increase in cross-border charges, which would have been 
expected after 1986 as Canadian companies restructure their payments to take 
advantage of the higher statutory corporate tax rate in Canada. 
Much of the statistical testing in this paper was rudimentary. As discussed 
above, there are a number of tax and nontax factors that explain debt, divi- 
dend, and cross-border charge ratios.  A full statistical analysis includes the 
modeling of  the financial decisions of  the companies so that the effects of 
exogenous factors, including  tax  reform,  could be disentangled  from each 
other. In future work, we intend to explore further this data set, as it is suffi- 
ciently rich to see how tax policy in Canada affects the financial and invest- 
ment behavior of U.S. multinationals. 
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Comment  Neil Bruce 
Ultimately, corporations investing abroad desire to repatriate the earnings of 
their investments. Tax considerations are likely to be an important influence 
both on the decision of how much to repatriate in a particular year and on the 
method-dividends,  cross-border charges, and other-to  be used. Hogg and 
Mintz make an important contribution to our knowledge of the importance of 
such tax  considerations by  examining the repatriation behavior of  a select 
number of U.S.  subsidiaries operating in Canada. They examine these firms 
over a time period that brackets some important tax reforms and changes that 
are likely, in theory, to have a substantial impact on repatriation behavior. 
They begin by discussing in detail the changes in Canadian and U.S.  tax 
law between 1984 and 1986 that would probably alter repatriation behavior. 
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Primarily, (1) U.S. statutory corporate tax rates declined relative to Canadian 
rates, reducing the overall foreign tax credit (FTC) limitation relative to FTCs 
generated;  (2) additional  separate limitations (‘baskets’) were  introduced, 
limiting the ability to average high- and low-taxed foreign income; (3) in de- 
termining the deemed-paid FTC, foreign taxes and affiliate earnings were to 
be  pooled  over  time,  eliminating  the  advantage of  the  “rhythm method” 
of  dividend repatriation; (4) sourcing and look-through rules were imposed 
and/or tightened to prevent U.S. parents from creating foreign income simply 
by  redirecting passive income through foreign affiliates; and (5) U.S. parents 
effectively were required to allocate more expenses, particularly domestic in- 
terest expenses, to foreign income. 
Hogg and Mintz proceed to formulate three hypotheses about the effect of 
these changes on financial and repatriation behavior: first, affiliates would be 
more likely to issue their own debt rather than to obtain such funds through 
the parent; second, cross-border charges (nondividend payments to U.S. par- 
ents) would increase; third, dividend repatriations would increase. The second 
and third hypotheses imply that total repatriations increase and that the firm 
would balance dividend and nondividend payments in order to minimize the 
tax liability generated. 
Although no formal model of firm repatriation behavior is developed, the 
authors motivate their hypotheses by pointing to the changes in tax prices and 
tax arbitrage opportunities resulting from the tax changes. This is somewhat 
helpful, but I think  it is instructive to consider the repatriation decision in 
more detail. 
The decision to repatriate is a decision not so much of whether to repatriate 
but of  when to repatriate. That is, the firm faces a choice whether to take the 
income home now or to reinvest its earnings in the host country for a period 
of  time and take them home in the future. In this regard, anticipations about 
future tax rates become important, and observed repatriation levels may well 
reflect these anticipations rather than the level of  taxes applying to repatria- 
tions. Although the 1986 changes probably reduced repatriation tax rates sig- 
nificantly, a firm need not be motivated to repatriate now if future tax rates are 
expected to be lower or, at least, no higher. The distinction is important be- 
cause it bears on the question of whether the extraordinary increase in divi- 
dend repatriations that the authors observe in their sample can be expected to 
continue. 
In other words, the empirical question is whether the increased repatriation 
levels observed occurred simply because existing tax rate levels on repatria- 
tions were lower after 1986, because firms prior to 1986 had anticipated the 
reduction in tax rates and postponed repatriations, or because firms believed 
the current tax rate applying to repatriations is abnormally low and could be 
expected to rise in the future, inducing them to repatriate now rather than wait. 
(This of course is similar to the problem faced when trying to determine how 
the level of  the capital gains tax rate affects realizations.) I do not know that 76  Roy D. Hogg and Jack M. Mintz 
the Hogg and Mintz data set will be able to cast any light on this issue, but I 
believe it is worth examining. 
Turning to the empirical part of their paper, I am struck by the fact that their 
results do not always relate to their hypotheses. As noted by the authors, the 
aggregate descriptive data seem to contradict the first and second hypotheses, 
with only the significant rise in dividend repatriations after 1986 supporting 
the hypothesis that tax changes motivated changes in repatriation behavior. 
The authors then report correlations of  variables across firms paying divi- 
dends,  a rather  small sample (I  believe nine  firms), but  they  do  not  say 
whether these correlations are across pooled time-series and cross-section ob- 
servations or across firms averaged over time. If the latter, the results do not 
directly test the hypotheses-which  are about the 1984-86  changes’ effects 
on  firm  behavior.  The  authors  do  report  confirming evidence  using  un- 
weighted average (across firms) values of the relevant variables over the two 
subperiods;  but  why  should  the  unweighted  averages be  better  than  the 
weighted averages (i.e., aggregate data)? If one huge firm were to decrease its 
cross-border  charges  over  the  subperiods while  two  tiny  firms  increased 
theirs, I wouldn’t necessarily see this as a confirming observation. 
Finally, I would like to raise one concern about the representative nature of 
the sample. The authors state that the parent companies of twenty-three of the 
twenty-eight  subsidiaries  in  their  sample were  in  excess  credit  positions 
throughout the period studied. How representative is this? Deutsch and Jen- 
kins (1982, 230) found that, in the 1970s, U.S. parents of Canadian subsidi- 
aries were typically in excess limitation position, except in the petroleum and 
wholesale trade industries. I bring this up because companies that are in ex- 
cess credit positions both before and after tax reform can be expected to re- 
spond less to the tax changes than do companies that are in excess limitation, 
and even less than companies that are switched from excess limitation to ex- 
cess credit by the tax changes. Perhaps this contributes to the apparently con- 
tradictory nature of the aggregate data in the authors’ sample. 
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